Ethnic Federalism and Conflict in Ethiopia by Abrha, Alexander Haymanot
Research on Humanities and Social Sciences                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5766 (Paper)   ISSN 2225-0484 (Online) DOI: 10.7176/RHSS 
Vol.9, No.13, 2019 
 
16 
Ethnic Federalism and Conflict in Ethiopia 
 
Alexander Haymanot Abrha 
Department of Civics and Ethical Studies, College of Social Sciences and Humanities, Raya University, P.O. 
Box 92, Maichew, Ethiopia 
 
Abstract   
Ethiopia adopted ethnic federalism and restructured the regions along ethnic lines as soon as the EPRDF took 
political power by overthrowing the Marxist military government in 1991.  EPRDF has advocated ethnic- 
federalism by stressing that it could empower and equalize the diverse ethnic communities and reduce conflict. 
However, since the introduction of the ethnic federal project in 1991, there have been wide-ranging claims 
especially by many Ethiopian intellectuals that the ethnic federal structure would collapse in a short time and the 
country could immerse into ethnic conflicts. The aim of this article is therefore to examine the prevalence of 
ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia and to explore the major reasons of the conflicts that existed in the past four years. 
There are contending views, for and against federalism in Ethiopia. And though it may be accurate to state that 
the founding principles of federalism have few ideological shortcomings, it may be that technicality issues that 
hamper the imposed federal system in Ethiopia. Thus, ethnic conflicts prevailing in Ethiopia may be caused by 
such technicality problems and the ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia needs an urgent reconsideration before 
the case moves to the worst scenario. 
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1. Introduction  
Federalism is a normative philosophical thinking that advocates self-rule and shared-rule in government 
arrangement, and advocates the division of powers and responsibilities through constitution among national 
government and constituent units, usually called states or provinces. The philosophy of federalism advocates and 
maintains the idea that local action in matters of local concern, and national action in matters of wider concern. 
Federation is the actual configuration that sets out objectives, principles, values, unique features and arrangement 
of governments. All these emanate from historical and current reality existed during the framing of the federation 
(Watts, 2008:1). From a theoretical stand-point, the importance of a federal system, as shared by all political 
theories of federalism, is the sharing of power among regional states. This division of power may lead to the 
extinction of tyrannical regimes. 
The other reason why a federal form of government is chosen over a unitary form is to accommodate 
divergent local interests that cannot bear centralized rule (Alemante, 2003:85). Owing to this, a federal system of 
government as a solution was high on the agenda during the early phase of post-colonial politics in Africa as a 
potential way to reconcile unity and diversity. Unfortunately, such attempts ended up being rather short-lived 
experiments. Those countries which employed federal systems for a short while and then curtailed them were 
Congo (1960–1965), Kenya (1963–1965), Uganda (1962–1966), Mali (1959), and Cameroon (1961–1972). 
Federalism's track record as a source of instability and secession might well counsel against choosing this form 
of government for Sub-Saharan African states (Alemante, 2003:85). Considering the negative experiences, a 
number of African countries have ignored a federal system of government. This is because the socio-cultural set-
up of the African states is so hybrid in terms of identity, language and religion that the existing social realities 
might not entertain the federal model. The most striking feature of African identities and communities was their 
fluidity, heterogeneity and hybridity; a social world of multiple, overlapping and alternate identities with 
significant movement of peoples, intermingling of communities and cultural and linguistic borrowing (Berman, 
2010:2). 
Notwithstanding such skepticism, three countries in Africa (Ethiopia, South Africa and Nigeria) have 
chosen a federal form of government so as to accommodate ethnic diversity. But there are significant degrees of 
difference in the ways ethnic power is allocated and used in the three federal governments of Africa. The 
Nigerian federal structure is to give legitimacy to territory over ethnicity by distributing the core population of 
each ethnic group in several states and thus Nigeria's federal structure helps avoid the crystallization of ethnic 
identity around a particular territory (Alemante, 2003:100). The South African constitution-makers rejected the 
claims of certain ethnic groups to self-governing status on the basis of their distinctive ethnic identity, whereas 
the organization of the Ethiopian state is founded upon ethnic federalism, which uses ethnic groups as units of 
self-government (Alemante, 2003:78). 
Seen from the perspectives of South Africa’s and Nigeria’s federal structures, Ethiopia’s federal 
arrangement is highly ethnocentric. Implementing the federal system of government on the idea of ethno-
Research on Humanities and Social Sciences                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5766 (Paper)   ISSN 2225-0484 (Online) DOI: 10.7176/RHSS 
Vol.9, No.13, 2019 
 
17 
nationalism, as shown in Ethiopia, could worsen matters. To put the idea more precisely, ethno nationalism, a 
belief claiming the distinctiveness of a particular people and their right to self-rule in their homeland will 
exacerbate community clashes into clashes of tribalism.  
Here, it should be noted that federalism is not the factor for ethnic conflicts; rather there are a number of 
perceptible modalities that should be taken into account along with federalism such as the practical 
implementation of federalism, the forms of federalism (symmetric or asymmetric/ congruent or incongruent), the 
socio-cultural set-up of the society, the degree of autonomy (given for sub-national government), the gravity of 
the regime’s totalitarian institutional structures, and the like. Under the banner of federalism, the aforementioned 
factors are easily manipulated by predatory elites for their own advantage, and in so doing they spoil the 
ideological foundations of the concept. The politicization of Ethiopian states changed to political ethnicization as 
ethnic leaders maneuvered to inherit power (Ake, 2003:3). Ethnicity itself (or our natural difference) cannot be a 
source of conflict. Rather the lack of understanding on the basic philosophy of federal arrangement(mismatch 
between theory vs. practice), which leads to lack of maintaining balance between self- rule and shared rule 
coupled with the politicization of tribal identity cause the ethnic conflicts.  
In light of this, the main objective of this article is to show the level of ethnic conflicts caused by the 
politicization of tribal identity in Ethiopia. This article is organized in to four sections. Section one gives a brief 
description of the historical background and the nature of the current political system in Ethiopia. Section two 
deals with ethnic conflict in Ethiopia and section three is about conflict-promoting applications of federalism. 
The last section, presents the conclusion and recommendations. Despite some human rights reports on ethnic 
conflicts in Ethiopia, no one has made an inventory of ethnic conflicts according to technicality problems of 
ethnic federal arrangement in Ethiopia. Thus, analyzing such conflicts with more Ethnic federalism and conflict 
in Ethiopia rigor made available by the social sciences and modern contemporary approaches is necessary. The 
method used in the study is qualitative and empirical data such as relevant documents produced by the 
government (EPRDF) and opposition parties, published and unpublished printed documents, reports compiled by 
human rights defenders and organizations have been used. 
 
2. Understanding Ethnic Federalism 
On assuming the leading role in a transitional government following the overthrow of Ethiopia’s Marxist-
Leninist regime in 1991, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) declared its target to 
pursue an administrative path of ethnic federalism. EPRDF argued that many ethnic groups, which include the 
TPLF, OLF, ALF, ONLF, had taken arms to resist the central state domination that rejected their existence and 
as a result the country has been immersed into unending conflict and constant bloodshed that could have led to 
the disintegration of the Ethiopian state altogether. For the EPRDF’s leadership, therefore, the only solution that 
could guarantee the survival of the country in united and peaceful manner is through the introduction of an 
ethnic federal system that could provide self-administration for every ethnic group in Ethiopia. Thus, ethnic 
federalism was presented as a choice beyond disintegration or oppression’ (Meles Zenawi, 1994: Interview,  
Efoyita Magazine). 
The better alternative to relying on force of arms is the mutual consent of the people to live together 
(Nahum, 2004). Similarly, a staunch TPLF’s advocate argues, ‘neither the Amharas and Tigrians nor the Oromos 
have a monopoly to dominate Ethiopia’s political scene on the basis of dynastic credentials, traditional claims, 
demographic advantages or the advantage of being better endowed with resources. The less endowed and the 
small nations also have legitimate rights to participate in its political process, economic life and in the 
burdensome task of rebuilding it. Thus, in 1991, ethnic federalism was considered as the only option that could 
save the state collapse.  
 
3. The adoption of Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia 
EPRDF itself and advocators of ethnic federalism portray that federalism has been emerged with the aim to 
transform the empire-state into a democratic state of ethnic federalism (Alem, 2003). Semahegn (2012), 
additionally strengths this idea by saying that ethnic federalism in Ethiopia transforms ethnic tensions into 
cooperation though it is also facing serious challenges. 
According to the EPRDF government, three decades ago, being the second most diversified nation in Africa, 
Ethiopia has been integrated with ethno-linguistic federal political arrangements. Dated on 1991, EPRDF has 
had engineered ethnic federalism as a means for addressing the national question of Ethiopian nations, 
nationalities and peoples, which could if not otherwise unfavorably prevailed by the former unitary systems of 
governments. Many scholars debated that ethnic federalism is a means to mitigate most of the problems raised 
by ethnic and minority nationalist conflicts (Lijphart, 2002). They tried to convince that granting self-rule to 
these ethnic groups will avoid the threat of existing as a distinctive group by which they can protect and promote 
their own cultures and values. Furthermore, they argued that it enables them to foster their interests both as a 
group and as single individuals. 
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Proponents of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia argued that unless diversified nature of the country is 
recognized through extending such a like structures, it would be a mere wish to reconstruct a unified and 
prospers Ethiopia. Granting the right to self-determination up to secession is the only way to sustain Ethiopia as 
a nation state. 
However, ethnic federalism in Ethiopia has had different implications in relation to managing the multi-
ethnic conflicts in the country. Therefore, a further detail on whether ethnic federalism intensifies ethnic 
conflicts or a means to manage it can be analyzed from the following angles. 
 
4. Ethnic Federalism and Ethnic Conflicts in Ethiopia 
For decades, ethnic federalism has been prescribed as a recipe for overcoming ethnic conflict and separatism in 
divided societies. However, debates on ethnic federalism exhibit two broad contending views. 
On the one hand, many scholars advocate the use of ethnic federalism as a way of stabilizing multi-ethnic 
conflicts. Most scholars who supported ethnic federalism argued that federalism is a means for managing ethnic 
conflicts than triggering the existing conflicts and/or generating the new ones. Agnew (2005), for example, 
squabbles, ethnic federalism helps to manage intergroup conflicts that might otherwise escalate into violence and 
lead to the proliferation of mini-states without much viability. Similarly, David and Donald (2008) asserted that 
ethnic federalism can play a role in managing political conflicts. By enabling local and regional authorities to 
wield a degree of autonomous power, elites at the political center can promote confidence among local leaders. 
Andreas (2003) concludes that formerly marginalized minority ethnic groups in Ethiopia have been given 
representation at federal and regional levels. To Horowitz (2005), ethnic Federalism could also be used to reduce 
inter-ethnic conflicts by the proliferation of points of power which in turn promotes inter-ethnic electoral 
cooperation, promoting alignments based on interests. 
In contrast to the above optimistic views about the role of ethnic federalism in reducing ethnic conflicts, 
there are scholars who argue that ethnic federalism exacerbates ethnic conflicts (Martinez, 2008). Skepticism 
about the use of ethnic federalism in managing ethnic conflicts relates in part to the susceptibility of multi-ethnic 
federations to fragmentation. The USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, which collapsed after the end of the 
Cold War, exhibited vulnerability of multi-ethnic federations to conflict and fragmentation. Even some of the 
existing multi-ethnic federations like Belgium appear in a state of what Graham Smith called ‘perpetual crises 
(Gagnon, 2001). 
Since the advent of ethnic federalism that politicized tribal identity, there have been a number of conflicts, 
cases of ethnic cleansing and unspeakable crimes committed against humanity in the country; and all these have 
taken place without fair responses from the ‘EPRDF/TPLF government’. Ethnic politics generates hostility 
amongst Ethiopia's different ethnic groups that hinders group interaction and entails ethnic conflicts. Due to the 
policy of the ruling party, mutual suspicion and hostility causing ethnic cleansing and conflict are bound to 
emerge even at the present time. What then are the conflict-promoting applications of ethnic federalism in 
Ethiopia? These include: 
a) The politicization of tribal identity (Ethnic federalism) 
As stated above, ethnic conflict cannot be blamed on ethnicity, but rather on the politicization of ethnic identity 
by self-seeking politicians. In light of this, of all the modalities of federalism (territorial, multi-national, ethnic, 
quasi-federal), ethnic federalism, with its politicizing of ethnic identity, is obviously the one that can cause inter-
ethnic problems. Research studies also show that if ethnic differences are high and politicized and if ‘federal 
bargain’ type solutions are difficult to achieve, then decentralization may result in greater ethnic mobilization 
and may lead to secession. In ethnically polarized countries, ethnic group loyalty induces citizens to vote for 
their ethnic party, which increases ethnic grievance and the probability of civil war. As can be seen from the 
table in the attached appendix, there have been a number of ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia since the introduction of 
ethnic federalism. For instance, due to government-spurred divisiveness, the two tribes (Guji and Borena Oromo) 
that have historically managed to peacefully alternate control of their own region have clashed due to the fact 
that the ‘EPRDF government’ has allegedly been inciting leaders of the subgroups. These scholars further state 
that the current situation in Ethiopia presents dangers that could affect all ethnic groups in the future in Ethiopia. 
That is, the federal system of government with the politicization of tribal identity could cause deep ethnic 
division that brings multiple problems such as secessionist movements and a culture of mistrust (Holder et al., 
2006:23). 
As noted in the foregoing paragraph, the ‘EPRDF’s constitution’ Article 47 (1) classifies the member states 
of the ‘Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’ as nine regional states and divided Ethiopians along ethnic 
lines thus institutionalizing their divisions. Furthermore, the constitution itself has the potential to invite conflict 
as in the case of self-determinism. Article 39 (1) of the Federal Constitution states: ‘Every Nation, Nationality 
and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession’. 
Considering article 39 (1), Aalen (2002:59) states that this is clearly a constitutional anomaly, and does not have 
any parallels in other federal systems today. A government that is concerned with the wellbeing of a nation does 
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not constitutionally encourage ethnically grouped people to set apart from the whole nation. Taking this article 
into account, some groups, such as the Oromo People Liberation Front (OLF) and the Ogaden National 
Liberation Front (ONLF), have fought against the federal government claiming the right to self-determination up 
to secession. Amnesty International (2014/15:151) points out that armed opposition groups remained in several 
parts of the country or in neighboring countries although in most cases with small numbers of fighters and low 
levels of activity. 
Article 39 (1) of the Federal Constitution has the potential to create lasting conflict, distrust and hatred 
among ethnic groups today. Vestal (1999:165) notes that mistrust and hatred among ethnic groups grow out of 
the EPRDF's theory of governance. The ‘EPRDF government’ has sought to govern by playing upon animosities 
between Ethiopia's different ethnic groups (Vestal, 2009:184). Citing the conflicts between the Dizi and Suri 
ethnic groups, the Oakland Institute’s field research (2014:16) indicates that the Ethiopian government is 
manipulating existing tensions between and among groups. The Human Rights Council (2015a:7) in its press 
release states that in every ethnic conflict, the hidden hands of governmental officials have been observed as 
trying to get political and economic advantages. It was not only the central policy of ethnic federalism that 
exacerbated tensions and conflicts, but decentralized ethnic-based administrations were also sowing seeds of 
ethnic awareness and antagonism. In other words, ethnic politics is able to divide the society, and ethnic groups 
are likely to develop mistrust against one another. In this regard, Turton (2006:14) argues that the federal 
‘remapping’ of Ethiopia along ethnic lines, by imposing a fixed ethno territorial grid on population with a long 
history of mobility and internal migration, has led to an increase rather than decrease of inter-ethnic conflict. 
To get rid of challenges related to ethnicity, countries tend to prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
ethnicity, to provide individuals with equal rights regardless of their ethnic identity (Alemante 2003:73), and to 
strictly ban ethnic politics or parties. For example, the multi-national western federations (such as Switzerland 
and Canada) do not support ethnicity as the chief instrument of state organization. Even in African countries, 
such as Uganda and Eritrea, tribal or religious parties are discouraged (Mesfin 1999:157). The Ghanaian 
Constitution, Article 55 (4), prohibits tribal or ethnic-based political parties and it clearly states ‘Every political 
party shall have a national character, and membership shall not be based on ethnic, religious, regional or other 
sectional divisions’. Contrary to this, the EPRDF Constitution, Article 46 (2), encourages ethnicity and tribal 
affiliation, and blatantly declares: ‘States shall be structured on the basis of settlement patterns, language, 
identity and consent of the people’. Ethiopia and Ghana are multi-ethnic societies with ethnic inequalities and 
historical rivalries but in Ethiopia, ethnic politics are the foundation and the lifeline of the TPLF which requires 
states to be structured as homogeneous tribal homelands, in much the same way as the Bantustans of apartheid 
South Africa (Alemayehu, 2015). Even during elections, Ghanaian candidates are of the TPLF which requires 
states to be structured as homogeneous tribal homelands, in much the same way as the Bantustans of apartheid 
South Africa. Even during elections, Ghanaian candidates are required to get a minimum level of support in all 
regions of the country (Alemayehu, 2015) but the Ethiopian government has been committed to perpetuating 
ethnic distinctiveness and political parties organized along ethnic lines. Accordingly, about sixty ethnically 
organized parties are found in the Ethiopian political landscape. 
In view of the above, a non-ethnic, non-tribal multi-party democracy is the only viable option that could 
guarantee stability, equity and economic development. This can be learnt from comparing Ghana and Ethiopia 
which are, respectively, democratic and developed, and undemocratic and poor. 
b) The design of the federal States 
The design of federal units and administrative structures, whether symmetric or asymmetric, may cause 
problems and conflict. As observed by Aalen (2002:66), as well as Yohannes and others (2005:34), the 
delimitation of the federal units in Ethiopia has not only created very dissimilar constituent parts and an 
asymmetrical federal system, but also many regional states with ethnic heterogeneity within their borders, and 
several states in which the competition between ethnic groups or clans for regional hegemony has led to 
destabilization and weakening of the regional governments. In symmetric federal arrangements, all federal units 
have the same powers and the same number of representatives in a second chamber of parliament but in the case 
of asymmetric federation, all federal units do not have the same powers. For example, Ethiopia and Russia which 
employ high levels of incongruent and asymmetric federalism, respectively, have experienced moderateto- high 
levels of conflict since adopting their most recent constitutional arrangements (Lancaster, 2012:60). Under 
symmetric federalism, sub regional states are treated as equals as in the case of the United States but in 
asymmetric federalism, sub-national governments are treated differently, such as in Russia where each ethnic 
republic has its own president, whereas the Oblasts and the Krai have appointed governors (Lancaster, 2012:7).  
A completely congruent system is one in which no federal subunit has a distinct social or cultural identity. 
For example, Australia would be a case in hand for a completely congruent federation, despite the fact that the 
Northern Territory has the highest proportion of indigenous Australians in any Australian state; on the other 
hand, the Ethiopian and Belgian examples represent nearly completely incongruent federalism, with the 
boundaries for those states drawn up on ethno-linguistic lines (Lancaster, 2012:24). The principles behind 
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asymmetric federalism’s potential to mitigate civil conflict in a state are similar to those of incongruent 
federalism (Lancaster, 2012:22). Ethiopia and Russia are somewhat similar in their designs of provincial units 
with Ethiopia a nearly incongruent federation featuring ethnically based subunits while Russia has extensive 
asymmetry with a nontrivial amount of subunits given special status in relation to the other federal subjects and 
the central government. On the other hand Brazil demonstrates completely congruent and symmetric federalism. 
Along with their forms of federation, Ethiopia and Russia have experienced civil conflicts at various 
junctures but Brazil has so far been a peaceful and stable federal state. Citing the quantitative sections of the 
study, Lancaster (2012:41) has shown that both incongruence and asymmetry have statistically significant effects 
on increasing the likelihood of conflict onset and the severity of conflicts. Groups that are not recognized under 
incongruent or asymmetric federations may organize protests to try to gain a greater level of recognition 
constitutionally (Lancaster, 2012:60). A case in point is the Sidama ethnic groups in Ethiopia having three 
million people and failing to get the status of a regional state whereas the Harari whose overall population is 185 
000 has been accorded a regional state. In the 2006–07 Ethiopian fiscal years, the Harari region received 
approximately 90 million Ethiopian birr (ETB) (Lancaster, 2012:46) but the Sidama Regional Zone got less 
since it did not have the regional status level. Inequitable distribution of wealth and poor fiscal management are 
said to cause problems in federalism. The troubles that these particular ethnic groups display show that 
incongruent and ethnic federalism can be a recipe for grievance and potentially for conflict if an ethnic group is 
not recognized as important enough by the federal government (Lancaster, 2012:46). 
Ethnic federalism in Ethiopia does not consider the existing social reality of a society so intertwined that it 
is hard to draw a line between or among the various ethnic groups. In the Ethiopian context, most ethnic groups 
could not inhabit territorially defined geographical areas. Pointing out the limitations of the federal system in 
Ethiopia, Assefa (2006:135) argues that a significant number of Ethiopians do not live in the places where the 
majority of the members of their ethnic group are to be found; they have moved, either voluntarily, in search of 
better opportunities, or by force, due to the Dergue’s resettlement and villagisation. 
c) Fiscal federalism 
Another important issue that needs much attention is the way in which money is distributed from the federal 
government to various regional states. In federation, central governments distribute funds to sub-national 
governments and there is a need to have effective systems of revenue sharing between the central and regional 
governments that could increase the effectiveness of the federal system. In distributing funds to sub-national 
governments, the central government could use a variety of fiscal federal criteria such as: population size, level 
of poverty and revenue generation capacity (Lancaster, 2012:45). In Ethiopia, the powers of sub-national states 
are constitutionally protected, but in reality the forms of decentralization are quite limited by fiscal, political and 
administrative centralism. Due to the subjectivity of the parameters and the autocratic nature of the federal 
government, the fiscal federal funds are not distributed to the sub-regional governments in a genuinely fair way. 
The management of the national resources does not serve the national objectives of realizing genuine 
development, reducing poverty and increasing the standard of living. In the absence of an effective, transparent 
and accountable system, the federal government dominates the process of fiscal distribution, which creates a 
sense of discontent among the various ethnic groups. 
For the structures of fiscal federalism to function properly, there needs to be a fair and equitable distribution 
of financial resources between the central government and the states (regions). Where this does not happen, there 
will obviously be a strong potential for conflict. For instance, a great deal of dissatisfaction in the federal-
provincial relationship in Pakistan has been observed around the distribution of financial resources. In the 
Ethiopian context, regional states have a weak fiscal autonomy and they have to depend on the federal 
government’s allocation of funds, which is quite unbalanced (Lancaster, 2012:45). 
d) Dominant-party governance 
In a similar vein, dominant-party control along with an undemocratic nature of a given state could be another 
factor that could create conflict among ethnic groups. Both the EPRDF in Ethiopia and the ANC in South Africa 
have dominated elections since the advent of federalism in the 1990s, but South Africa is relatively democratic 
and Ethiopia authoritarian; South Africa has a relatively advanced economy, but Ethiopia does not (Dickovick, 
2014). When the less secure People's Democratic Party (PDP) in Nigeria is also taken into account, it may be 
said that dominant-party governance holds across the range of regime types from a relatively democratic South 
Africa through the flawed democracy in Nigeria to the exclusionary authoritarian system in Ethiopia. The 
Ethiopian federal structure appears to be that of one-party state governance, which is characterized by highly 
concentrated and centralized powers maintained by totalitarian institutions such as the military, other security 
organs and state-controlled mass media. 
Despite the fact that the EPRDF has had a federal-like system in theory, the centralized power coupled with 
authoritarianism and undemocratic nature of the regime equates the government with the communist party of 
USSR. The collapse of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia created a situation in which the 
effectiveness of constitutional federal structures has been questioned. Some scholars have argued that democratic 
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deficits in communist countries as well as federal systems, which were organized around national groups, 
promoted nationalist movements to their eventual  fall as federations (Bunce, 2004). 
One of the most significant reasons for the formation of a federal government has been to combat tyrant 
regimes by decentralizing the powers of the government. But an attempt to mix Marxist ideology of one-party 
rule with federalism is believed to create contradictory scenarios. The former indoctrinates centralization of 
political power while the latter teaches decentralization of power. As it is quite evident today in Ethiopia, the 
blending of two contradictory ideologies coupled with the modalities of the federal structures (such as ethnic 
federalism, asymmetric and incongruent forms of federalism, dominant-party governance) provide valid reasons 
for the prevailing ethnic conflict in Ethiopia. 
An attempt has been made here above to give an overview of federalism, mainly focusing on its forms and 
types. In a nutshell, in a multi-national and multi-cultural country, federalism might be an effective method of 
bringing about political stability and order. However, inappropriate application of the principle in a specific 
context, such as that of an authoritarian and undemocratic government, may yield just the opposite results, which 
may contribute to ethnic clashes and conflicts, and to disintegration of national unity. 
 
5. Conclusion Recommendations 
5.1. Conclusion 
The Ethiopian government/EPRDF/ introduced ethnic federalism to address the national questions because in the 
pre-federation of Ethiopia there was ethnic inequalities, civil wars and ethno-nationalist call for self-
determination including secession. The core justification behind the current Ethiopian ethnic based federal 
arrangement is to facilitate a fertile ground for the various nations and nationalities to have a say in their own 
affairs with little control from the center or any other dominant group. 
Ethnic federalism has failed to solve ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia. Conflicts have become very common 
between ethnic groups. These conflicts have led to the death of many innocent people, the destruction of 
property, and the dislocation of many people. Universities have also become the center for ethnic conflicts and 
are frequently closed due to ethnic clashes. Moreover, due to ethnic conflicts ethnic minorities are being expelled 
from various regions. 
Ethnic conflict is caused by the politicization of ethnic/tribal identity by self-seeking politicians. The 
predatory elites are applying ethnicity as a fuel of ethnic stratification based on identity as a major criterion. 
They have diverted the viable and vibrant multicultural federal project to Con-federal arrangement that is the 
central government is weak than its members and failed to manage and coordinate the common areas of interest 
among the states. 
 
5.2. Recommendations 
Ethnic federalism in Ethiopia enables to recognize the diversity of distinct ethnic groups specially by granting 
them an opportunity to speak by their own languages. However, it also led to ethnic conflicts by which different 
ethnic groups mistrust each other and, as a result, endangered the sense of nationalism. Thus, it is highly 
recommended that the recognition of diversity should not go at the expense of national ideal. 
The federal structures in Ethiopia should adopt a mixed federal system that guarantees ethnic groups’ self-
government with high inducements for integration and inter-ethnic collaboration so as to maintain the unity and 
integrity of Ethiopia. Quite number of studies pinpoints that one of the courses in conflict prevailing in Ethiopia 
is the disparity in sharing, distribution, and shaping of power and wealth among the peoples of the country. 
Therefore, consociation governance or structural and functional power sharing based on the principle of ‘equity 
and law’ should be introduced. More specifically, this study recommends that proportionality in civil service 
equipment, a higher degree of autonomy for each segment to run their internal affairs and constitutional vetoes 
for minorities have had a paramount importance for Ethiopia. 
The secession right granted by the 1995 FDRE constitution must be repealed and then replace by 
consensual secession which is negotiated secession that happens when the constitution does not say anything 
about secession. This typology of secession does not consider secession as of a right or as a best alternative of 
managing diversity rather it considers secession as a last resort. 
Ethiopia has to create a “national public” to overcome conflicts caused by recent constitution and historical 
claims of various groups. This article recommends that it is better to re-arrange the ethno-linguistic borders 
delineated by the constitution, which should be the first step towards depoliticizing ethnicity. 
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